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Abstract 
The article assesses the empirical veracity of the frequently heard thesis that strict 
embryo research laws can hinder innovation in embryo and stem cell research, and 
thereby impede the innovative ability of the medical biotech sector. Based on a 
comparative study of the OECD countries, and case-study material, the article ar-
gues that this thesis can only partly be confirmed. Strict embryo research laws are 
associated with a lower innovation quota in stem cell research. But this correlation 
mostly reflects stable structural differences between national innovation systems 
rather than dynamics triggered by policy measures. Permissive embryo research 
laws are not automatically associated with an innovative biotechnology sector, and 
the innovativeness sometimes is a partly unintended consequence, rather than the 
result of an active political strategy. The results of the analysis caution against un-
due simplified theses on the impact regulation can have on the innovative ability of 
national economies. If there are impacts of embryo research laws on the innovative 
ability of the biotech sector, they will be visible only in the long term. Short-term 
political steering efforts have to be judged very sceptically.  
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1 Introduction 
Research institutions, politicians and 
representatives of the pharmaceutical 
industry alike claim that embryo and 
stem cell research are part of the 
most promising branch of medical 
biotechnology, and that exceedingly 
strict regulation of this research se-
verely impedes innovation in the 
medical biotechnology sector (Stand-
ing Committee on Legal and Consti-
tutional Affairs 2000; Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft 2001; Associa-
tion of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry (ABPI) 2004). On the other 
hand, opponents of stem cell re-
search doubt the veracity of this 
claim. They argue that a ban of em-
bryonic stem cell research is ethically 
necessary and does not inhibit inno-
vation (Campbell 2001; Lilge 2001; 
Spaemann 2001). 
The actors in this debate have mostly 
used abstract reasoning, hypothetical 
examples, or anecdotic  evidence. 
Empirical studies on the conse-
quences of permissive or strict em-
bryo research laws on the innovative 
ability of national research systems 
are rare. This article tries to fill this 
gap, and analyzes empirically whose 
claims can be confirmed. Embryonic 
stem cell research is part of the scien-
tific and political agenda since ten 
years (Gearhart 1998; Thomson 
1998), and the first laws that explic-
itly deal with embryonic stem cell 
research date back to the same time. 
Laws regulating embryo research – 
the larger research field in which 
stem cell research is embedded – 
have been passed as early as 1987. 
Thus, it is not premature to conduct a 
first evaluation of the question 
whether strict embryo research laws 
do indeed impede innovation in stem 
cell research. 
Methodologically, the article applies 
a quantitative approach and traces 
the relationship between the strict-
ness of embryo research laws and 
innovations in the stem cell sector in 
the Western OECD countries from 
1994 to 2006. The quantitative com-
parison is used to draw some general 
conclusions about the hypothesis, 
and to identify interesting country 
cases, which are studied in more de-
tail. Thereby, the advantages of quan-
titative and qualitative approaches 
are combined and their weaknesses 
compensated (Lieberman 2005). 
The article argues that the relation-
ship between the embryo research 
law and the innovative ability of the 
medical biotech sector is complex 
and does not correspond to the views 
of either of the opponents in the de-
bate. There is no systematic short-
term effect, executed by the strictness 
of embryo research laws, on the in-
novativeness in the stem cell field. 
Neither do strict laws lead to a de-
cline of innovations, nor do permis-
sive laws automatically lead to an 
increase in innovations. The field is 
rather characterized by long-term 
structural differences. Case studies 
additionally lead to the conclusion 
that an increase of the innovativeness 
of the sector may in a few cases be 
the result of a political strategy, but 
coevally it often may be a concomi-
tant phenomenon of regulatory inac-
tivity. Thus, the argument that strict 
regulation instantly impedes the in-
novative ability, and permissive regu-
lation leads to an increase in innova-
tions is not supported. That does not  
exclude, however, that different em-
bryo research laws in the long run 
and in a more subtle way may have 
such an effect. 
The structure of the article is as fol-
lows. The second section  outlines in 
short the controversy and the theo-
retical arguments, and additionally 
formulates the main hypothesis. In 
the third section the data and meth-
ods used to test the hypothesis will be 
focused on. The fourth section com-
prises the analysis. The fifth section 
summarizes the findings and hints at 
further venues of research. 
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2 The controversy: Are bio-
ethics and innovative abil-
ity incommensurable? 
Embryo and stem research are elu-
sive notions, hence some basic defini-
tions must be clear to get an overview 
of the field and to understand the 
major promises and ethical prob-
lems. Embryo research is here con-
ceived as all techniques or scientific 
enterprises focusing on the human 
embryo. The embryo is the first sta-
dium of human development, from 
the first division of the zygote (the 
fertilized egg) until it becomes a fetus 
(that is, major structures and organ 
systems begin to form). 
Human embryos first came on the 
political agenda in 1978, when the 
first baby was born using in-vitro-
fertilization (IVF). For IVF, eggs are 
fertilized – i.e. embryos created – 
and implanted into the womb of a 
woman in order to bypass certain 
forms of infertility. Additionally, the 
successful conduct of IVF showed 
that human embryos could be culti-
vated in a laboratory setting (Lau-
ritzen 2001). For technical reasons, 
the number of embryos created for an 
IVF usually is larger than the number 
actually used for implantation. These 
surplus embryos are kept in a frozen 
state, but are almost never used for 
fertility treatment, as the donor cou-
ples have usually finished their fam-
ily planning with one successful IVF 
treatment. Medical researchers de-
mand to use these surplus embryos 
as an object of research. Another im-
plication of IVF is that the embryos 
to be implanted may be screened 
beforehand to avoid hereditary dis-
eases. The so-called pre-implantation 
diagnosis is still in its infancy. How-
ever, by the selection of the sex of the 
child it is possible to avoid hereditary 
diseases that are located on the sex-
determining chromosomes. Never-
theless, screening is only a simple – 
and ethically contentious – selection 
procedure. Nobody is cured, only the 
“wrong” embryos are put away. If 
scientists would try to change the 
genetic endowment of the embryo, 
this would go under germline therapy 
(Stock/Campbell 2000).  
The short sketch of these techniques 
already shows the gray area between 
reproductive medicine – the use of 
established techniques to cure dis-
eases – and embryo research – the 
scientific enterprise of gaining new 
knowledge without immediate thera-
peutical implications. The line be-
tween cure and research is more 
clearly crossed with non therapeutic 
research, that is, research that uses 
the embryo as a raw material and 
without any intention of creating a 
child. The derivation of human em-
bryonic stem cells is one form of such 
non therapeutic research. Stem cells 
are a very promising object for re-
search, as they are still totipotent, 
which means that they can differenti-
ate into any mature cell type. For 
example, they could in principle be 
used to create brain or nerve cells, as 
replacements for decayed ones 
(Gearhart 1998; Thomson 1998). The 
source for these stem cell lines can be 
the aforementioned surplus embryos, 
but scientist often demand that it 
should be allowed to create embryos 
for research purposes only, without 
any IVF treatment in mind. Particu-
larly, the creation of embryos via 
therapeutic cloning is often seen as 
desirable. Therapeutic cloning is the 
creation of an embryo with the same 
genetic characteristics as a mature 
human being. This genetic identity is 
especially desirable for the creation 
of replacement tissue or organs, as 
the risk of rejection is much lower 
when the replacement tissue has the 
same genetic information as the re-
cipient. If the same basic cloning 
technique is used to create a child, 
this is called reproductive cloning. 
The ethical problems with the diverse 
techniques of embryo research are 
manifold and complex. The easiest 
judgment can be made about thera-
peutic research: there is nothing 
wrong with observing the develop-
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ment of an embryo. The other tech-
niques are more contentious. The 
most obvious problems arise with all 
the techniques that lead to the de-
struction of the embryo. If one con-
ceives of the embryo as a human be-
ing, all these techniques are funda-
mentally wrong and should not be 
carried out. The trouble here is the 
word “if”. Some scientists and ethi-
cists see the embryo as equivalent to 
a human being (Ryan 2001), others 
do not (Green 2001; Steinbock 2001). 
Different, but similarly complex, is-
sues arise with germline therapy and 
reproductive cloning – no human 
being is killed here. But as Habermas 
(2001) argues, these techniques vio-
late the bodily and moral integrity of 
the cloned and/or genetically modi-
fied child (Mendieta 2004). 
One of the major tenets  in the debate 
is the question whether there is an 
insurmountable tension between the 
promises of therapeutic innovations 
and the ethical considerations. Can 
we reap the benefits of biomedical 
innovations, and at the same time 
uphold strict bioethical principles 
(Salter 2007)? Proponents of stem 
cell research claim that innovation 
and strict bioethical principles are 
incommensurable. According to 
them, the imposition of strict embryo 
research laws severely impedes the 
innovative ability of the medical bio-
tech sector (Jones/Towns 2006). The 
argument follows two lines: First, 
certain research venues – e.g. re-
search on human embryonic stem 
cell lines – are positively forbidden, 
and thus impossible to carry out in a 
given jurisdiction. Second, even sci-
entists that currently do not work 
with embryonic stem cells might be 
afraid to „cross the red line“, and 
precautiously move to another juris-
diction, where the laws are more 
permissive. This is all the more im-
portant, as scientific progress in the 
sector is rapid, and laws could be 
considered to be too rigid to keep 
pace with the scientific develop-
ments. Thus, restrictive embryo re-
search laws should dispel researchers 
and therefore lower the innovative 
ability of a national economy. The 
ramifications are clear: a decline of 
innovative ability in biotechnology 
leads to economic decline of the sec-
tor, and, ultimately, to the loss of 
jobs. On the other hand, permissive 
embryo research laws should attract 
researchers, and, in turn, generate 
more innovations in medical bio-
technology.  
These arguments can be found in 
public debate all around the world. 
For example, the Australian parlia-
ment conducted a public hearing on 
the regulation of stem cell research 
(Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs 2000). Sue 
Serjeantson, as representative of the 
Australian Academy of Science stated 
clearly „if Australia is to capitalise on 
its undoubted strength in medical 
research then it is important that 
research on human therapeutic clon-
ing is not inhibited by […] unduly 
restrictive legislation in some states.“ 
(ibid.: 63) And: „The academy be-
lieves that scientific progress is pro-
ceeding at such a rapid rate that, if 
we put in place restrictive legislation, 
it is quite possible that […] we are left 
in an environment where we have 
inadvertently hindered some of the 
research that might go forward.“ 
(ibid.: 79) In line with this, Austra-
lian scientists threatened more or 
less openly to leave the country if a 
restrictive law would be passed. Simi-
lar arguments from scientists, indus-
try representatives, and high-ranking 
politicians can be found in the 
French (Hénard 2001; Viv-
ille/Ménézo 2002), German 
(Schröder 2000; Dams 2001; Win-
nacker 2001), Italian (Lorenzi 2003), 
Norwegian (Hazekamp/Hamberger 
2005), Swiss (Interpharma 2001; 
Interpharma 2002), or British debate 
(Mulkay 1997; Blair 2000; Sleator 
2000), and in the debates about 
European Union research funding 
(Salter 2005). 
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Opponents of stem cell research, on 
the other hand, claim that the prom-
ises of embryonic stem cell research 
are widely exaggerated by the re-
searchers. According to them, the 
promises of stem cell research do not 
justify the destruction of human em-
bryos. Besides this, they claim that 
other lines of research, like the use of 
stem cells taken from umbilical cord 
blood, bone marrow or fetuses are 
ethically less contentious and scien-
tifically as promising or even more 
promising than the use of embryonic 
stem cells. Thus, from the opponents’ 
point of view, passing strict laws on 
stem cell research is ethically neces-
sary. Furthermore, it does not inhibit 
the innovative ability, because 
enough other lines of research are 
still open for ambitious researchers. 
These arguments appear in public 
debates frequently – though not as 
frequently as their counterparts, be-
cause often more basic religious ar-
guments are submitted and the inno-
vative ability is thought to be clearly 
secondary to religious reasoning. 
Nevertheless, many opponents of 
stem cell research explicitly consider 
the question of innovative ability, and 
put forward the argument sketched 
above, that strict ethical standards 
and innovative ability can be recon-
ciled. The argument is headed by 
scientists (Höffe 2001; Kollek 2001; 
Spaemann 2001; Fukuyama 2002), 
religious actors (Australian Catholic 
Bishops Conference 2000), politi-
cians (Lindner 2001), and even by 
representatives of the pharmaceutical 
industry (Geyer 2001). 
Thus, we have two countervailing 
claims about the impact of strict em-
bryo research laws on the innovative 
ability of the biotech sector. The pur-
pose of the remainder of this article is 
to test the hypothesis brought for-
ward by the proponents of stem cell 
research: „Strict embryo research 
laws have a negative effect on the 
innovative ability of the medical bio-
tech sector; permissive embryo re-
search laws have a positive effect on 
the innovative ability of the medical 
biotech sector.“ 
 
3 The concepts: How can we 
operationalize embryo re-
search laws and innova-
tive ability? 
The hypothesis stated in the last sec-
tion includes two main elements: the 
strictness of embryo research laws as 
the independent variable, and the 
innovative ability of national econo-
mies in the biotech sector as the de-
pendent variable. These two concepts 
must be operationalized in order to 
test the hypothesis. 
For the independent variable, this 
article proposes a measure of the 
strictness of embryo research laws 
based on the various techniques of 
embryo research, that may or may 
not be allowed. Nine basic techniques 
have been identified. Data on embryo 
research laws of 21 OECD countries 
have been gathered, indicating 
whether these basic techniques are 
allowed (coded 0) or forbidden (co-
ded 1). The techniques and their cod-
ing can be seen in Table 1. Added up, 
these binary variables constitute the 
Embryo Research Index (ERIN-
DEX).1 Main source for the data is 
the survey on the legal situation in 
the EU countries done by Gratton 
(2002) for the European Group on 
Ethics and new Technologies and the 
surveys of the Council of Europe 
(1998) and the UNESCO (2004). 
These data have been cross-checked 
and complemented using legal stud-
ies (Eser et al. 1990; Koch 2001), case 
studies (Bleiklie et al. 2004) and e-
mail correspondence with the rele-
vant ethics councils and ministries. 
                                                             
1  To avoid concept stretching, only 
parliamentary laws that target both the 
private and public sector were coded. 
Constitutional provisions, funding guide-
lines etc. were not coded. 
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Table 1: Composition of the embryo research index * 
Variable Description of Procedure Coding 
THR Therapeutic research: non-harming 
research. 
0 (allowed) / 1 (forbidden) 
TSS Therapeutic sex selection: the selec-
tion of the child’s sex after genetic 
testing in order to avoid hereditary 
diseases. 
0/1 
GLTH Germ line therapy: the manipulation 
of the human germ line in order to 
influence genetically determined char-
acteristics. 
0/1 
NTHR Non-therapeutic research: research 
that destroys the embryo 
0/1 
NTHRAGE The age or stage of development until 
which non-therapeutic research may 
be done. 
 
0 (no time limit) 
0.5 (up to 14 days after fertilization) 
1 (forbidden in principle) 
EPRES Embryo production for research pur-
poses: the production of embryos 
solely for the purpose of research. 
0/1 
ESCR Embryonic stem cell research: re-
search on human embryonic stem 
cells (which must necessarily have 
been created using human embryos). 
0 (use and production of stem cells 
allowed) 
0.5 (use of imported stem cell lines 
allowed, but no production) 
1 (completely forbidden) 
* The aim of the index is to map the abstract “possibility space” of embryo research. All of 
these techniques are theoretically possible, whether they are allowed or forbidden is an em-
pirical question. The elements of the index are mostly, but not completely, logically inde-
pendent from each other: if stem cell research is allowed, then, logically, non-therapeutic 
research has to be allowed (but not vice versa); if non-therapeutic research is allowed, then 
NTHRAGE cannot be 1; and if therapeutic cloning is allowed, embryo production for re-
search purposes has to be allowed (but not vice versa, as embryos may be produced by other 
means). 
 
The dependent variable is the innova-
tive ability of a national economy in 
the medical biotech sector. This arti-
cle proposes to operationalize the 
innovative ability of the medical bio-
tech sector using the proportion of 
patents in microbiology2 of the total 
                                                             
                                                                      
2  EPO classification C12N („Micro or-
ganisms or enzymes, compositions 
thereof“), the same category that the 
patents; a measurement that could be 
loosely termed „biotech innovation 
quota“. 
There are some disadvantages of this 
operationalization. The time lag be-
tween patent application and the 
granting of a patent is sometimes 
original stem cell patents fall in. Source 
for the data: http://ep.espacenet.com/ 
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very long. Combined with the rela-
tively short time frame of the analy-
sis, this means that at the moment 
long-term developments can not be 
analyzed adequately. The proportion 
of biotechnology patents does not 
testify anything about the impor-
tance, let alone quality, of the innova-
tions. Neither does it tell us some-
thing about the economic importance 
of the innovations. And it does not 
distinguish between patents in “red” 
and “green” biotechnology. A more 
precise indicator would be desirable, 
but is at the moment not available. 
However, there are reasons to believe 
that the indicator can serve as a good 
proxy measure for the innovativeness 
of the medical biotech sector. A grow-
ing number of patents in microbiol-
ogy and genetic engineering should 
be the first detectable sign of an im-
proved research environment due to 
permissive embryo research laws. 
Besides this, to measure the propor-
tion of patents in the sector offers an 
intersubjective measurement, which  
 
allows to compare between countries 
and over time. Additionally, taking a 
policymakers perspective, if one 
would consider the biotech sector to 
be strategically important, the quota 
of biotech patents should be a good 
benchmark to assess whether the 
sector prospers, or not. In conclu-
sion, given the scarce supply of cross-
country and time series data about 
biotechnology research performance 
(Van Beuzekom 2001; Arundel 
2003), using the proportion of medi-
cal biotech patents is a reasonable 
proxy for the innovative ability of the 
sector. 
 
4 The analysis: A complex 
relationship 
A first descriptive analysis of the data 
reveals a considerable variation of 
the independent variable, the strict-
ness of embryo research laws. Table 2 
shows that, so far, no regulatory 
model has become universally ac-
cepted. Instead, we observe a variety Table 2: Regulatory situation in the OECD countries in 2007** 
Country THR TSS GLTH NTHR 
NTH-
RAGE 
EP-
RES ESCR 
REP-
CLON 
THER
CLON 
ERIN-
DEX 
BEL 0 0 0 0 0,5 0 0 1 0 1,5 
GBR 0 0 1 0 0,5 0 0 1 0 2,5 
SWE 0 0 1 0 0,5 0 0 1 0 2,5 
NZL 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
AUS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
DEN 0 0 0 0 0,5 1 0 1 1 3,5 
FIN 0 0 0 0 0,5 1 0 1 1 3,5 
GRC 0 0 0 0 0,5 1 0 1 1 3,5 
NEL 0 0 1 0 0,5 0 0 1 1 3,5 
CAN 0 0 1 0 0,5 1 0 1 1 4,5 
FRA 0 0 1 0 0,5 1 0 1 1 4,5 
SPA 0 0 1 0 0,5 1 0 1 1 4,5 
SUI 0 1 1 0 0,5 1 0 1 1 5,5 
AUT 0 1 1 1 1 1 0,5 1 1 7,5 
GER 0 1 1 1 1 1 0,5 1 1 7,5 
ITA 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
NOR 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 
**The USA, Ireland, Luxemburg and Portugal are missing, as they have no law regulating the 
public as well as the private sector as of 2007.  
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 of embryo research laws. Using a 
rough classification, one may distin-
guish three categories of countries. 
First, a group of permissive regula-
tors, comprising Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and New Zealand. 
This group is characterized by the 
fact that all members allow the so-
called therapeutic cloning.3 Second, a 
group of restrictive regulators, com-
prising Austria, Germany, Italy and 
may start with the most simple form 
of cross-sectional plot. Figure 1 plots 
the average proportion of biotech 
patents (1998-2005) against the 
strictness of national embryo re-
search laws (2007). 
Figure 1 shows that restrictive em-
bryo research laws are indeed inter-
related to a lower innovative quota in 
stem cell research. The cross-
sectional graph clearly shows that the Figure 1: Relationship between strictness of embryo research laws and innova-
tive ability Norway. This group is characterized 
by its ban on non-therapeutic re-
search. All the other countries are 
intermediate regulators that try to 
find a middle way between the two 
extreme groups. 
The question posed in the theoretical 
part is: does the considerable variety 
of embryo research laws translate 
into a systematic variety of the inno-
vative ability of the respective coun-
tries? An analysis of this question 
                                                             
3  In terms of overall strictness, the 
Australian law is similar to the law of 
New Zealand. However, as therapeutic 
cloning is scientifically and politically of 
supreme importance I use the admission 
or non-admission of this technique in 
order to differentiate between permissive 
and intermediate regulators. 
countries with the most restrictive 
embryo research laws – Austria, 
Germany, Norway and Italy – have 
the lowest biotech innovation quota. 
This finding resonates with the avail-
able case studies in the field (Körtner 
2002; Burrell 2005: 22). On the 
other hand, a permissive law does not 
guarantee innovations in the medical 
biotech sector. A comparison of 
Denmark and Finland shows that 
even countries with very similar em-
bryo research laws exhibit consider-
able differences in their biotech in-
novation quota. 
However, a cross-sectional perspec-
tive may obscure more than it re-
veals. A comparison of average values 
may simply reflect stable long-term 
level differences.  
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From a political and strategic – as 
well as scientific – point of view, the 
more intriguing question is whether a 
correlation between permissive em-
bryo research laws and a high inno-
vative ability can also be shown over 
time. If the introduction of a liberal 
embryo research law is followed by 
an increase in the biotech innovation 
quota – or vice versa, the introduc-
tion of a restrictive law is followed by 
a decline of the biotech innovation 
quota – the case for the strategic im-
portance of embryo research laws – 
and the incommensurability of inno-
vation and ethics – would be 
strengthened. 
Thus, a longitudinal analysis is 
needed to complement the cross-
sectional picture. Figure 2 offers a 
longitudinal perspective, disaggre-
gated to show the development of the 
biotech innovation quota in different 
country groups. 
Figure 2 allows some further conclu-
sions. On the one hand, the data un-
derline that Figure 1 does partly re-
flect stable structural differences. The 
group of restrictive regulators has a 
lower biotech innovation quota than 
the group of permissive regulators 
from the outset. On the other hand, 
the data show that these level differ-
ences have increased. After 1998 – 
after the breakthroughs in stem cell 
research – the biotech innovation 
quota increased in all countries, but 
most markedly in the group of per-
missive regulators. 
In conjunction, Figure 1 and Figure 2 
thus suggest that permissive embryo 
research laws indeed contribute to a 
higher innovative ability in the medi-
cal biotech sector.  
Or, to interpret the data more cau-
tiously: Permissive embryo research 
laws might be a necessary condition 
for a high biotech innovation quota, 
but no sufficient condition (see for 
example Sweden or Finland in Figure 
1). 
 Figure 2: Development of the biotech innovation quota over time for permis-
sive and strict regulators, compared to the overall mean.*** 
 
*** As outlined in the text, the United Kingdom, Sweden, New Zealand and Belgium can be 
considered permissive regulators, while Austria, Germany, Italy and Norway are strict regu-
lators.  
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 A further step of disaggregation plots 
the biotech quota for single countries 
against the time dimension, thus 
allowing conclusions about which 
countries might deliver further evi-
dence for or against the hypothesis. 
Figure 3 plots the biotech quota for 
the group of permissive regulators: 
Belgium, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and Sweden. In all other 
countries under study, the quota re-
mains more or less stable. This im-
plies that there is no sharp decline in 
the biotech innovation quota in the 
countries that have passed strict laws 
on embryo research.4 These findings 
further caution against the hypothe-
sis that permissive embryo research 
laws have an short-term effect on the 
innovative ability of the sector. 
The disaggregation into country tra-
jectories cautions our interpretation 
even further, especially concerning 
the active political intervention and 
steering abilities governments can 
have. There are only three possible 
examples for “heroic innovation pol-
icy” that can be found in the country 
sample studied: Belgium and New 
Zealand have passed very liberal laws 
on stem cell research (see Table 2), 
and both countries have seen a con-
siderable rise of their biotech innova-
tion quota (see Figure 3). Further-
more, the United Kingdom has 
passed a very liberal law, but its in-
crease in biotech innovation quota is 
not as marked as in Belgium or New 
Zealand.5 The fourth country in the 
permissive group, Sweden, has not Figure 3: Development of the biotech quota in the group of permissive regula-
tors  
 
                                                             
                                                            
4  One might argue that the quota was 
so low from the outset that there was no 
room for a sharp decline. Another impli-
cation of this finding is that Denmark, 
which outstands in Figure 1, has always 
been strong in biotechnology patents, 
with no major impact of the embryo re-
search laws. 
 
5  A possible explanation for this exam-
ple is the fact that the United Kingdom’s 
research profile is more heterogeneous, 
with more innovative sectors than in 
Belgium or New Zealand. Thus, changes 
in the proportion of biotech patents are 
harder to achieve. 
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experienced a change in the biotech 
innovation quota. 
These results of the quantitative 
overview allow us to identify interest-
ing country cases and pose more spe-
cific research questions. Especially 
the four cases presented in Figure 3 
merit our attention. The sharp in-
crease of the biotech innovation 
quota in Belgium and New Zealand 
(and the more smooth increase in the 
United Kingdom) raises the question 
whether these cases can be character-
ized as evidence for the thesis that 
permissive embryo research laws 
lead to innovations, or if we see only 
statistical artifacts. Additionally it 
will be to discuss, if these countries 
prove to be evidence for the thesis, 
what are the mechanisms and policy 
measures that lead to the success? On 
the other hand, the case of Sweden 
raises the question why the country 
was not able to capitalize on its per-
missive embryo research law. A 
closer investigation of these cases will 
allow more nuanced conclusions 
about the conditions under which 
liberal embryo research laws lead to a 
higher innovation quota in the medi-
cal biotech sector. 
Belgium is a difficult case to inter-
pret. On the one hand, Belgium con-
firms the thesis; it has been one of 
the leading countries in artificial re-
productive technology. Thus, when 
the stem cell research breakthroughs 
occurred, Belgium already had an 
established research base in applied 
medical biotechnology (Varone 
/Schiffino 2004). As it had no special 
law regulating embryo research up to 
2003, it was considered a “bioethical 
paradise” (Varone/Schiffino 2004: 
85). Public opinion was very positive 
towards biotechnology (Schiffino 
/Varone 2004). Together with the 
United Kingdom, Belgium is consid-
ered to be one of the most research-
friendly environments for stem cell 
research in Europe, and is either co-
coordinator or project partner in a 
large share of EU-funded research 
projects involving stem cells (Euro-
pean Commission 2005). On the 
other hand, this Belgian success story 
is rather a by-product of political 
struggle and not the result of an ac-
tive political strategy to promote life 
sciences. The boom in biotech pat-
ents in Belgium occurred from 1998 
to 2001. However, the very permis-
sive Loi relative à la recherche sur 
les embryons in vitro was passed 
only in 2003. Up to this time, the 
lack of a law in Belgium cannot be 
considered a part of a coherent politi-
cal strategy. Rather, intense political 
struggle within a coalition compris-
ing Christian democrats prevented 
the passage of a law on embryo re-
search. The secular parties in gov-
ernment preferred a liberal law; 
Christian democrats preferred a strict 
law, the result was a deadlock situa-
tion in which no law could be passed 
(Schiffino/Varone 2004; 
Varone/Schiffino 2007). The secular 
parties could accept this deadlock as 
a second-best solution, because the 
lack of a law partly coincided with 
their preferences. However, they pre-
ferred the passage of a law to a law-
less space, and when the Christian 
democrats left the coalition due to 
electoral defeat, a law was quickly 
passed. Thus, the biotech boom in 
the lawless space from 1998 to 2001 
occurred to some extent “behind the 
backs” of the political actors. 
Thus, Belgium confirms the thesis 
that liberal embryo research laws are 
associated with a prospering and 
innovative medical biotech research 
sector, although this cannot be at-
tributed to an active political strat-
egy, and is rather the (partly) unin-
tended consequence of policy dead-
lock. 
New Zealand’s success story is simi-
larly equivocal. New Zealand has an 
ethics committee regulating embryo 
research since 1993.6 As early as 
                                                             
6  The National Ethics Committee on 
Assisted Human Reproduction (NE-
CAHR). 
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1996, a bill regulating embryo re-
search – the Human Assisted Repro-
ductive Technology (HART) bill – 
came into the parliamentary arena, 
but lay dormant for a long time in the 
Health Committee (Barr 2003b). 
Under the impression of the stem cell 
research breakthroughs, the Labour 
government re-animated the bill in 
2003. Due to the Westminster system 
with few veto points, the government 
was able to push through the liberal 
bill (Barr 2003a), and the HART act 
was passed in 2004. Public opinion 
towards medical biotechnology and 
stem cell research is generally posi-
tive (Warren/Osborne 2006), sup-
ported with headlines like “Stem cells 
could end need for heart transplants” 
or “Blind could see again with new 
medical breakthrough”, “’Incurable’ 
illness falls to gene therapy”, or 
“World on the edge of a new era of 
drug discovery” in the New Zealand 
Herald.7 New Zealand Universities 
are amongst the leading research 
institutions in stem cell research, 
with a particular record in neurologi-
cal research (Futurewatch 2006). 
What makes the increase in stem cell 
related patents even more intriguing 
is that the amount of state funding is 
comparatively low. Only NZ$2.3 mil-
lion per annum are allocated to stem 
cell projects (Futurewatch 2006: 
53).8 However, similar to the Belgian 
case, the increase in innovations in 
stem cell research occurred before 
the permissive law was passed in 
2004. In the New Zealand case, the 
delay of the law was not due to coali-
tion struggles, but rather to conflicts 
and hesitation within the governing 
party. However, the conclusion re-
mains the same: the success of the 
sector seems to have been a partly 
unintended consequence rather than 
the result of a political strategy. 
                                                             
                                                            
7  http://www.nzherald.co.nz 
8  This is about €1.2 million. The state of 
California alone spends $300 million a 
year on stem cell research (Schwägerl, 
2004). 
Thus, the case of New Zealand leads 
to a similar conclusion as in the Bel-
gian case. On the one hand, the lib-
eral regulative situation seems to 
have been supportive for the increase 
in innovations in the stem cell field. 
On the other hand, this does not en-
tirely reflect the intended conse-
quence of a political strategy. 
The United Kingdom was the first 
country to liberalize its embryo re-
search law after the breakthroughs in 
stem cell research. The Human Fer-
tilisation and Embryology Regula-
tions from 2001 allowed therapeutic 
cloning, and were part of an explicit 
strategy to promote biotechnology as 
an integral element of the knowledge 
society (Blair 2000; Banchoff 2005). 
As a traditional leader in biotechnol-
ogy (Gottweis 1998), with a strong 
role of the Royal Society as a policy 
advisor (Krönig 2001), and an al-
ready established overview and li-
censing system (the Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Authority 
HFEA), the United Kingdom was in 
an ideal position to build on its ex-
perience and strengthen its innova-
tiveness in the biotech sector. How-
ever, as Figure 3 shows, the bulk of 
the increase in biotech innovations 
occurred from 1996 to 2001, under 
the old Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act, dating from 1990. This 
act was permissive from the outset9, 
and, at its time, introduced with the 
explicit aim to strengthen the United 
Kingdom’s research base in biotech-
nology (Mulkay 1997). Hence, the 
United Kingdom could capitalize on 
the stem cell research breakthroughs 
because the regulatory framework 
that was already in place was liberal 
enough to keep researchers in the 
country. 
Thus, the case of the United Kingdom 
fully confirms the thesis that permis-
sive embryo research laws lead to an 
increase in the innovative ability of 
 
9  Though not as permissive as its suc-
cessor, with an ERINDEX of 4. 
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the biotech sector; although the case 
suggests that the effects are to be 
assessed on a more long-term time 
frame. 
Sweden at first contradicts the thesis. 
Sweden had a relatively liberal em-
bryo research law since 199110, that 
was changed in 2005 to allow thera-
peutic cloning, and with the explicit 
aim to strengthen the Swedish re-
search position in biomedical appli-
cations (Kulawik 2003). However, as 
exemplified in Figure 3, the relatively 
liberal law of 1991 was not accompa-
nied by an increase in the biotech 
innovation quota. But the Swedish 
case may illuminate the limits of a 
quantitative approach to innovative-
ness. The quota of patents may not 
have increased, but according to all 
observers, Sweden is a world leader 
in stem cell research (Torgersen et al. 
2002; Kulawik 2003; Burrell 2005). 
The funding of 257.3 Mio SKR (27 
Mio €) from 2003 to 2008 expresses 
the high priority that stem cell re-
search has in the Swedish innovation 
system (Hague 2006), and the Karo-
linska Institute in Stockholm and the 
Sahlgrenska Academy in Gothenburg 
are amongst the leading suppliers of 
stem cell lines. Thus, the quality of 
the Swedish innovations in the bio-
medical sector is high, though its 
proportion compared to total patents 
is low. This may reflect a distinct 
“patenting culture” (Packer/Webster 
1996), focusing more on quality than 
on quantity. 
Thus, the case of Sweden is illustra-
tive for two reasons. First, it confirms 
the thesis that permissive embryo 
research laws can lead to innova-
tions. Second, it illustrates the limits 
of a quantitative approach to the field 
and the usefulness of qualitative in-
depth material. 
To sum up the conclusions of this 
analysis: There seems to be an inter-
connection between strict embryo 
                                                             
10  ERINDEX of 4.5. 
research laws and a low innovation 
quota in stem cell research in cross-
country comparison, which would 
confirm the thesis outlined in the 
theoretical section. However, this 
statistical interconnection has to be 
interpreted very cautiously. First, the 
same does not apply vice versa. Per-
missive embryo research laws are not 
consistently associated with a high 
innovation quota in stem cell re-
search. The variation of the innova-
tion quota increases as the embryo 
research laws get more permissive, 
but there are countries with permis-
sive or intermediate embryo research 
laws and a low innovation quota in 
stem cell research. Second, the disag-
gregation of the data and the study of 
country trajectories reveals that there 
are only very few countries in which 
the innovation quota in stem cell 
research has changed substantially in 
the last 13 years. This illustrates as 
well that the countries, which have 
passed strict laws, have not experi-
enced a decline of their innovation 
quota. Third, in the countries that did 
experience a sharp increase of the 
innovation quota in the stem cell 
area, there is some evidence that this 
increase is causally linked to a per-
missive regulatory situation. How-
ever, there is less evidence that this is 
due to a conscious political strategy. 
If one considers the temporal dimen-
sion, the increase of innovations in 
the medical biotech sector did often 
occur before political actors had de-
cided on how to regulate the sector. 
Only in two countries of the exam-
ined – Sweden and the United King-
dom –the prospering of the biotech 
sector can be attributed to a distinct 
political strategy. Fourth, the time 
frame of the analysis is still rather 
short. At this moment, all we can 
safely conclude is that embryo re-
search laws have no large systematic 
effect in the short term. What the 
long-term effects are – possibly in the 
form of path-dependent or self-
reinforcing dynamics (Pierson 2000) 
– is open to speculation. Finally, all 
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the results must be interpreted in 
light of the used indicator. The quota 
of microbiology/stem cell patents is 
only a proxy measure for the innova-
tiveness of the sector. It does not say 
anything about the total number of 
patents in the sector – here, e.g. 
Germany can easily outshine Bel-
gium. And it does not say anything 
about the importance or the quality 
of the patents (as the case of Sweden 
indicates). Thus, all the conclusions 
from this analysis must be read with 
some caveats as to their generaliza-
bility. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Taking together the results of the 
analysis and all the caveats, this arti-
cle depicts a sector in which stable-
long term differences in the innova-
tiveness are dominant, and govern-
ment interventions in the form of 
permissive laws do not have a pre-
dictable and stable effect in the short 
term. The cases of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, where such a strat-
egy did succeed, must be weighed 
against the large number of other 
cases, in which the biotech innova-
tion quota remained stable, or cannot 
be causally linked to the strictness of 
the embryo research law. Innovative-
ness of the medical biotech sector 
seems to be in considerable parts 
determined by stable structural dif-
ferences. Policy measures, like per-
missive or strict embryo research 
laws, seldom have a short-term im-
pact on the innovativeness of the 
sector. 
This finding cautions the hopes – and 
promises – of many actors that claim 
to introduce permissive embryo re-
search policies in order to reap short-
term gains in innovative ability. This 
strategy may work, but more often, 
changes in the innovativeness of the 
sector cannot be attributed to strate-
gic political decisions. This finding 
also casts doubts on the ability of 
states to steer scientific develop-
ments and sectors and to force inno-
vations by policy measures. 
However, proponents of strict laws 
on bioethics should not draw the 
conclusion that embryo research laws 
do not matter at all for the innovative 
ability of a national economy. First, 
the analysis has revealed that none of 
the countries that have passed strict 
regulation was able to raise its bio-
technology innovation quota, while at 
least some of the permissive regula-
tors were able to increase their bio-
tech innovation quota. Second, due to 
the relative youth of the research and 
policy field, this article could only 
illuminate a relatively short time 
frame. What the long-term conse-
quences of different embryo research 
laws will be is an open question. Re-
cent theorizing about the self-
reinforcing nature and nonlinear 
dynamics of social processes 
(Mayntz/Nedelmann 1987; Pierson 
2004) suggests that small differences 
in innovative ability may add up at an 
increasing rate, thereby generating 
path-dependent developments. 
Maybe the question of how to regu-
late stem cell research proves to be a 
critical juncture, and 20 years from 
now, the countries that chose a per-
missive law today will have a lead in 
the sector the other countries are 
unable to catch up with. 
A final caveat is that all conclusions 
must be seen in the light of the limi-
tations of the indicator used for inno-
vative ability. As discussed in the 
methodological section, the propor-
tion of biotech patents cannot pre-
cisely represent the quality or eco-
nomic importance of the innovations, 
the time lag between patent applica-
tion and patent grant means that 
long-term developments may not 
appear in the data, and the indicator 
does not distinguish between “red” 
and “green” microbiology. Thus, the 
picture painted in the quantitative 
analyses is not – and cannot be – as 
fine-grained as the picture from in-
depth case studies. More detailed 
case studies are needed to uncover 
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the social mechanisms that link the 
regulatory framework and the inno-
vative ability of the biotech sector. 
But the conclusions from the quanti-
tative analyses are a rough map of the 
relationship between the regulatory 
situation and the innovativeness of 
the biotech sector. They can serve as 
a starting point for case selection, 
and can be useful to embed the in-
sights from case studies in a larger 
context. 
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